Geopolitics Explained

How Do Other Major Geopolitical Powers Influence The Balkans?

Dylan Muggleton — Thu, 20 Aug 2026 10:36:48 GMT

Contents

Introduction
Russia In The Balkans
Turkiye In The Balkans
China In The Balkans
The Balkans Looking Forward
Concluding Remarks

Bitesize Edition

Russia’s Declining Influence - Russia’s energy and political influence in the Balkans is likely to weaken as Serbia and other states become increasingly connected to Europe. However, Russia can still support pro-Russian political actors, exploit Serbia-Kosovo tensions, and support Republika Srpska’s autonomy ambitions. Russia may therefore try to slow Western integration, even if its capacity to do so is constrained by the war in Ukraine.
Türkiye’s Strategic Position - Türkiye has strong historical, cultural and geographical connections across the Balkans, but its immediate strategic focus remains the Middle East. Despite this, Türkiye can maintain relationships with the United States, EU and other emerging powers while acting as a strategic partner to Balkan states. This could give Türkiye an important role as the region becomes more connected.
China’s Balkan Investment - China has expanded its influence through the Belt and Road Initiative, including major investments in Piraeus and infrastructure across Serbia. These projects connect the Balkans to China’s wider European trade networks and provide alternative trade routes through a strategically important region. Unlike Russia, China is not necessarily responding to Western moves, but pursuing its own long-term economic and supply-chain interests.
A Multipolar Balkans - The United States and European Union are unlikely to be direct rivals in the Balkans, although disagreements over issues such as Bosnia’s next High Representative and energy policy can create tensions. Instead, the region is likely to see European integration alongside U.S. security, energy and technological influence, while China, Türkiye and Russia remain relevant in the region to different extents, and for different reasons. Ultimately, the Balkan states themselves are also not passive actors, and the hope is that they could use this period of change to maximise their own strategic options.

Introduction

On Monday, we explored the United States’ role in the Balkans.

This is connected to NATO, which remains active in Kosovo via KFOR, and the EU, with many Balkan nations EU candidates for accession. The United States’ influence, the rise of Balkan states towards the EU, and a slow calming of tensions and fragmentation across the Balkans are trends I expect to see over the coming years, as we’ve established over the last few weeks in our discussions.

However, other geopolitical actors are relevant in the Balkans.

Today, we will discuss how Russia, Türkiye, and China are active in the Balkans, and whether these nations will affect the future direction of the Balkans, or if the United States, NATO, and the European Union will be the biggest geopolitical actors contributing to the region’s future direction. Let’s dive in below.

How Does The United States Influence The Balkans?

Dylan Muggleton — Mon, 17 Aug 2026 16:12:42 GMT

Contents

Introduction
The United States and History
The United States and Business Deals
Concluding Remarks

Bitesize Edition

The United States And Balkan Intervention - The United States became a decisive geopolitical actor in the Balkans through its involvement in the Bosnian and Kosovo Wars. From NATO intervention to Dayton, IFOR, and KFOR, U.S. influence shifted from military intervention towards peacekeeping and long-term security. Today, KFOR remains active in Kosovo, and the legacy of US intervention continues to shape the region.
Energy As Geopolitical Power - The United States is increasingly using economic and energy relationships to make moves across the Balkans. A $6 billion LNG agreement with Albania and the proposed Southern Interconnection pipeline between Bosnia and Croatia could reduce the region’s dependence on Russian energy. In the Balkans, can energy infrastructure create geopolitical influence for the United States?
United States Investment In The Balkans - U.S.-linked investment is also expanding into tourism, technology, infrastructure and real estate, from Jared Kushner’s Albanian developments to proposed AI infrastructure in Croatia. But recent protests surrounding the Albanian projects and opposition to the former Yugoslav Army headquarters development in Belgrade highlight that U.S. economic influence is not always welcomed. Meanwhile, U.S. sanctions against Serbia’s Russian-owned NIS show how economic power can be weaponised to challenge Russian energy influence in the region.
A New Form Of Influence? - Based on these recent pursuits, the United States has seemingly moved from military intervention in the Balkans towards a broader combination of security, energy, investment and economic power. Whether these relationships develop into a deliberate strategy for expanded geopolitical influence remains uncertain. Also, other major powers could respond.

Introduction

Last Thursday, we discussed Kosovo and how domestic issues and relations with Serbia and Albania will affect its future trajectory.

However, there are further states to consider when it comes to the future direction of not only Kosovo, but the entire region of the Balkans.

Today, we’ll discuss how major geopolitical powers will drive changes in the Balkans, with a specific focus on the United States. How are recent pursuits driving change in the Balkans today, and where will these actions take the region in the coming decades? Let’s discuss below.

The United States And History

The recent U.S. military intervention in Venezuela and Iran, and considerations surrounding Greenland and Cuba, aren’t a new trend for the United States. Throughout history, the United States military has intervened in states around the world, and the Balkans are no exception.

The Bosnian War between 1992 and 1995 saw initial reluctance from the United States, but over time, they pushed more and more for a settlement.

In 1995, the United States got directly involved when NATO conducted airstrikes against Bosnian Serbs. The Dayton Peace Agreement then heavily involved the United States. In the aftermath, NATO deployed the Implementation Force (IFOR). IFOR was replaced by SFOR in 1996, but was ended in 2004. The EU then took over the stabilisation role through EUFOR Althea.

In 1999, the Kosovo War saw the United States involved once again. NATO conducted airstrikes, which led to Yugoslav forces withdrawing from Kosovo, and the creation of the Kosovo Force (KFOR). KFOR remains active today, with over 4000 troops from 31 countries present in Kosovo. In June 2026, NATO announced a gradual reduction of KFOR’s position since security in Kosovo had improved. If the security situation deteriorates, NATO has made it clear it will reverse the decision. But this does imply some of the more promising scenarios we discussed last Thursday could become reality.

Over these years, the United States went from limited military intervention in the Balkans to supporting peacekeeping and state-building. This has seen them remain somewhat influential in the region today. But is the United States today trying to turn this influence into economic influence, especially under the Trump Administration?

Photo by The Now Time on Unsplash

The United States and Business Deals

In the last few months, we’ve seen some economic developments in the Balkans.

The four examples are a $6B LNG agreement in Albania, the Southern Interconnection gas pipeline, Croatia’s nuclear energy projects and AI infrastructure, and recent development projects in Albania. Let’s break these developments down in more detail.

In April 2026, US LNG producer Venture Global signed an agreement with Albania’s Aktor LNG. This $6B deal will span a 20-year period, and it details U.S. LNG exports to Albania.

This begins to reduce the Balkans’ dependence on Russian energy sources. As such, this U.S. pursuit of economic and trade relationships has geopolitical consequences without the typical forms of direct geopolitical intervention that we’ve seen the United States is willing to pursue.

This also highlights how the Trump Administration wants to boost LNG exports. Ultimately, energy is life, and nations need energy to function in modern-day societies. Nations that are self-sufficient in energy have options. They can use their energy sources to protect themselves, or they can trade that energy and hope to establish trade relationships with others. This trade of energy can make other nations dependent on these energy sources if they rely on them too much. Nations on the other side of these relationships need to consider how they could be coerced if dependence grows too deep.

This is one thing that Trump has been doing during his Presidency. He has been seeking to boost U.S. resilience, both domestically via industrial buildout, and globally through trade and energy.

By some indicators, the United States is a declining superpower. Debt levels are skyrocketing, education quality is declining, and internal political tension is elevated. Trump’s moves here to boost resiliency are hence necessary.

Photo by KWON JUNHO on Unsplash

Also on the energy front, we’ve seen the Southern Interconnection as a proposed gas pipeline connecting Bosnia and Herzegovina to Croatia’s gas infrastructure. This project is financially backed by the United States and is valued at above $1.5B. AAFS Infrastructure and Energy is the key investor and the project leader. Interestingly, AAFS is led by Jesse Binnall, who is a former Trump lawyer, and Joseph Flynn, who is the brother of a former Trump national security advisor. By connecting Bosnia to Croatia, one huge geopolitical consequence will once again be reduced Russian energy dependence for the Balkans.

The United States’ pursuit of gas infrastructure is opposed by some environmental groups in Europe, who argue that Bosnia has renewable energy potential. However, nations ultimately will rely on energy sources that they possess, or energy sources that are the cheapest. Nations also value reliable energy sources. Natural gas is more reliable than intermittent energy sources, despite the cleanliness of renewables.

Nations have different economic profiles, with developed nations pursuing renewables in a different position when compared to developing nations. Developing nations would need to be incentivised to pursue renewable sources; otherwise, cheap and reliable sources will be preferred. This could be contributing to this tension here.

The difference between the European energy vision and the American energy vision in Bosnia and Herzegovina is yet another area where the United States and Europe are pitted on opposite sides of a singular geopolitical issue in Bosnia. The appointment of a new High Representative in Bosnia is still splitting the Americans and the Europeans.

Photo by Turhan Can Kargin on Unsplash

Croatia is also pursuing nuclear energy projects with the United States’ help, which further embeds American energy in the Balkans and undermines the Russians. Also, Croatian company Rade Koncar and U.S. company Pantheon Atlas signed a letter of intent for an AI data centre project valued at close to €50B. This could also mark the beginning of U.S. technological influence entering the Balkans via infrastructure buildout.

And then we see the recent activity of Jared Kushner’s Affinity Partners. The Sazan Island and Zvernec development projects in Albania aren’t the only stories. In 2024, Affinity Global Development agreed to a 99-year lease of the former Yugoslav Army headquarters in Belgrade. The proposal was to turn this site into hotels, apartments, and offices, but Kushner’s company withdrew from the project in December 2025 due to tension surrounding the project. Both this Serbian project and the protests in Albania highlight that economic influence from the United States isn’t always accepted in the Balkans.

But the United States’ position as an economic superpower can also be weaponised. Serbia’s oil company NIS is majority owned by Russia’s Gazprom. As Serbia’s only oil refinery, it is pivotal to Serbia’s energy profile.

The United States sanctioned NIS in 2025 due to this Russian connection. This sees the United States attempting to reduce the Balkans’ energy connection to Russia even more, but this time, through sanctions.

In 2026, Hungary’s MOL company was negotiating to purchase the Russian stake, with a provisional agreement from January 2026 not yet finalised. The United States has continued to grant extensions for negotiations, likely hoping for this deal to grow into a successful purchase.

And so, some only see Trump as pursuing business deals to help his friends and family; but he is also pursuing energy, technology, infrastructure and economic projects in the Balkans for the United States. This is a pursuit that the Trump Administration has openly admitted to pursuing, hoping to expand influence in the region.

Photo by ben o'bro on Unsplash

How will others respond to these moves made by the United States? It’s this that we’ll discuss on Thursday.

Concluding Remarks

The United States is making moves in the Balkans. Whether these strategies in energy, technology, and investment turn into pursuits of expanded geopolitical influence will be told with time. But, often, we see other nations respond to geopolitical moves, even if they wouldn’t lead to dramatic geopolitical shifts in isolation.

On this front, we’ll next discuss how Russia, Turkiye, and China influence the Balkans, and if they will make moves to support or rival the United States. From there, we’ll analyse how all of these nations will shape the future of the region. Keep an eye out for this discussion, which will be released on Thursday.

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This Week In Geopolitics - 16th August 2026

Dylan Muggleton — Sun, 16 Aug 2026 11:31:27 GMT

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Looking Forward In Kosovo

Dylan Muggleton — Thu, 13 Aug 2026 20:14:46 GMT

Contents

Introduction
Where Do We Go From Here?
Scenarios Looking Forward
Concluding Remarks

Bitesize Edition

Political And Demographic Pressures - Kosovo’s future will be shaped by its young, predominantly Albanian population, political instability and demographic decline. Weak institutions, migration and economic challenges could make international recognition and EU membership difficult to achieve. These pressures will influence which of Kosovo’s potential futures becomes reality.
Closer Relations With Albania - Kosovo and Albania could deepen their cooperation through infrastructure, energy, and trade, while also potentially developing a de facto union while remaining separate states. Formal unification is possible but highly unlikely given the wider geopolitical consequences. Alternatively, Albania’s faster integration with the EU could cause the two countries to gradually diverge.
The Serbia-Kosovo Stalemate - Relations with Serbia could slowly normalise, remain frozen, or deteriorate into another crisis centred on Northern Kosovo. Serbian recognition would fundamentally change Kosovo’s position and could open the way for deeper European integration. A territorial settlement remains unlikely because changing borders could create wider instability across the Balkans.
Kosovo’s Future Direction - Kosovo could eventually join the EU, achieve greater stability while remaining outside it, or increasingly rely on Albania as demographic and economic pressures grow. For now, frozen relations with Serbia and closer ties with Albania appear the most plausible trajectory. However, Kosovo’s domestic political stability will ultimately determine whether it can move towards a more positive future or become trapped in demographic and economic decline.

Introduction

On Monday, we discussed the history and current political situation in Kosovo. The history of Kosovo is deep, and this history continues to affect relations with both Albania and Serbia.

Also, with the current political deadlock in Kosovo, future scenarios are up in the air.

And so, today, we’re going to explore these potential future scenarios that could unfold for Kosovo, with a focus on Kosovo’s domestic trajectory, both politically and economically, and key relations with both Serbia and Albania.

What Is Happening In Kosovo?

Dylan Muggleton — Mon, 10 Aug 2026 22:42:40 GMT

Contents

Introduction
Politics In Kosovo
Where Are We Today?
Concluding Remarks

Bitesize Edition

Kosovo’s History - Kosovo’s modern political situation is rooted in a complex history involving the Ottoman Empire, Albania, Serbia and Yugoslavia. The Kosovo War in the 1990s and NATO intervention in 1999 were decisive in shaping its current status. Kosovo ultimately declared independence from Serbia in 2008, although it remains only partially recognised internationally.
Political Deadlock - Kosovo’s political system has experienced significant instability, with repeated elections and difficulties forming functioning governments. One party, Vetevendosje, has remained the largest political force, but has repeatedly fallen short of the 61 seats required for a parliamentary majority. Disputes over coalition-building, Assembly leadership and the presidency have continued to create political uncertainty.
Where Are We Today? - The June 2026 election again saw Vetevendosje win the most seats, taking 53 of the Assembly’s 120 seats, while PDK, LDK and AAK followed behind. However, turnout fell to just 37.03%, the lowest recorded level in Kosovo history, highlighting frustration with the prolonged political deadlock. Even after the election, disagreements over constituting the new Assembly demonstrated that the underlying political crisis had not disappeared.
What Comes Next? - Kosovo’s future will depend not only on resolving its domestic political instability but also on its relationships with Serbia and Albania. Relations with Serbia remain particularly important given Kosovo’s unresolved international status and wider geopolitical competition surrounding the country. With another political crisis unfolding, the next stage will be to examine how these relationships could shape Kosovo’s future.

Introduction

The history of Kosovo is as rich as the rest of the Balkan region. Kosovo was a part of the late Ottoman Empire in 1878, in a period that was also marked by rising Albanian nationalism.

The League of Prizren in 1878 established Kosovo as an important centre of Albanian political mobilisation.

Kosovo also had historical, cultural, and religious connections to Serbia. Kosovo was incorporated into the Kingdom of Serbia after the Balkan Wars in 1913, and after World War I, it became part of Yugoslavia. During this period, Kosovo did receive periods of autonomy, particularly per the 1974 constitution. But this autonomy was reversed in the decades that followed.

It was these historical events and many others that contributed to the tensions surrounding Kosovo today. These relations between Kosovo and both Albania and Serbia remain relevant today.

And so, in today’s discussion, we’re going to explore this history in more detail, before exploring the political situation in Kosovo, and how relations with Serbia and Albania continue to define the region. Let’s dive in.

Politics In Kosovo

The 1990s and the Kosovo War were instrumental in Kosovo’s trajectory to where it finds itself geopolitically today.

In Kosovo, this period saw the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) emerge. This escalated the conflict between the KLA and Serbian forces, and eventually saw the NATO intervention in 1999.

In the aftermath, UN Security Council Resolution 1244 placed Kosovo under international administration. During this period, its status remained unresolved. This was until Kosovo declared independence from Serbia in February 2008.

Since then, Kosovo has established itself, and it functions as an independent nation, despite not possessing full global recognition of this.

To best understand the last few years in Kosovo, we need to look to the political system. In Kosovo, the President is the head of state while the Prime Minister is the head of government. The President is elected by the legislative branch, while the Prime Minister and government also require the support of the Assembly. In Kosovo, citizens vote via direct popular vote in parliamentary elections. The Assembly of Kosovo, the legislative branch, has 120 members. Ten of these seats are reserved for the Serb population, while ten more seats are reserved for non-Serb minorities, such as Bosniaks.

Photo by Besart Ademi on Unsplash

These reserved seats can be the subject of political tension within Kosovo. During the 2021 election, two newly created minority parties had been supported by the Serb List, which is the dominant Serbian party in Kosovan politics. These new minorities won two seats and one seat, respectively. However, these parties faced accusations of strategic voting to gain control of seats outside of the ten reserved seats for Serbs. This election was also marked by a 49% increase in Bosnian minority voting when compared to the 2019 elections, with a large share of these votes coming from Serb-dominated regions. This led to the electoral panel removing hundreds of votes, and the two newly created minority parties lost one seat each. This highlights that the political system in Kosovo is susceptible to political interference, especially from Kosovo’s neighbours.

In Kosovo, there are multiple main parties, including Vetevendosje (LVV), the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), and the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK). Often, these parties struggle to form majority governments. This was the case in the two elections that took place in 2025.

Firstly, in February 2025, Vetevendosje won the most seats, with 48 seats. This saw them lose 10 seats from the previous election in 2021, with LDK and PDK gaining 5 seats each.

After this election, no party was able to be formed in government since LDK and PDK refused to form a coalition with LVV.

LDK instead proposed a transitional government that included all the ethnic Albanian parties.

Photo by Venora Cerimi on Unsplash

Also, after this election, no Speaker of the Assembly of Kosovo was elected. This issue persisted until August 2025, when Dimal Basha was finally chosen by the Assembly.

From August to October, Kosovo found itself in another crisis due to the election of the Serbian Deputy Speaker of the Assembly. This was resolved in October when the Assembly elected Nenad Rasic.

However, two attempts to form governments by Vetevendosje after this were both rejected because a parliamentary majority was not secured during either attempt. This led to the dissolution of the Assembly.

As a result, elections occurred once again in December 2025.

Despite Vetevendosje also winning the most votes of any party in this election, they only secured 57 seats of the 120 in the Assembly. 61 is needed for a majority. This resulted in a hung parliament, but eventually, a government formed with the support of nine minority seats. It was then the failure to elect a President in March 2026 that led to the downfall of this government. The Constitutional Court of Kosovo gave the Assembly 34 days to elect a new President. After they failed to do so, the Assembly was dissolved.

This once again led to another set of parliamentary elections, which took place recently in June 2026.

Photo by Element5 Digital on Unsplash

Where Are We Today?

The 120 members of the Assembly are elected by open list proportional representation with a four-year term. Seats are allocated using D’Hondt, with a threshold of 5%. This means any party requires 5% of the overall vote before they can be represented in the Assembly.

In this election in June 2026, Vetevendosje won 53 seats, losing 4 seats from the previous election in December 2025. The Democratic Party of Kosovo remained unchanged with 22 seats, while the Democratic League of Kosovo won 18 seats, gaining three from the previous election. The Alliance for the Future of Kosovo party won 7 seats, gaining one seat. The remaining seats were won by the minority parties.

So, despite its fourth consecutive victory and its status as the largest party, Vetevendosje still didn’t secure a majority. It is notable that the party lost support from December 2025, but they are still expected to form a government with the help of the nine minority representatives.

Voter turnout of 37.03% was the lowest in recorded history in Kosovo, suggesting growing frustration with this political deadlock that has plagued Kosovo for years.

Since June, the newly elected Assembly hasn’t yet been properly introduced. The latest deadline expired without a new President being chosen, and the session descended into chaos. This included an opposition MP throwing eggs at Vetevendosje leader and acting Prime Minister Albin Kurti.

Photo by Fajar Al Hadi on Unsplash

And so, from this current environment, where do we go from here? We’ll discuss this on Thursday.

Concluding Remarks

Two of Kosovo’s most important relations are with Serbia and Albania. On Thursday, we’ll explore the fallout from these recent elections and how both of these nations will drive the potential future scenarios that we could see unfold for Kosovo. If that sounds of interest, keep an eye out for that discussion, which will be released on Thursday.

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Sources:

https://www.britannica.com/place/Kosovo
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-18331273
https://www.crisisgroup.org/cmt/europe-central-asia/kosovo/toward-normal-relations-between-kosovo-and-serbia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_recognition_of_Kosovo
https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10012/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unification_of_Albania_and_Kosovo
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Kosovo
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_political_parties_in_Kosovo
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democratic_League_of_Kosovo
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/February_2025_Kosovan_parliamentary_election
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/December_2025_Kosovan_parliamentary_election
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Kosovan_parliamentary_election
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Kosovo
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/28/kosovo-accuses-serbia-of-involvement-in-paramilitary-ambush

This Week In Geopolitics - 9th August 2026

Dylan Muggleton — Sun, 09 Aug 2026 23:56:57 GMT

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What Is Happening In Albania?

Dylan Muggleton — Thu, 06 Aug 2026 20:47:36 GMT

Contents

Introduction
Protest In Albania
The Youth of Today
Is There A Solution?
Concluding Remarks

Bitesize Edition

Albania’s Protests - Albania’s “Flamingo Revolution” began over proposed luxury tourism developments backed by Jared Kushner, but quickly expanded into wider opposition to corruption, political accountability, and economic opportunity. The protests became part of a broader pattern of Gen Z-led mobilisation seen across countries including Bangladesh, Kenya, Nepal, Serbia, Morocco, and India. The key lesson is that a specific event can become a catalyst for much deeper frustrations within society.
A Generational Crisis - Gen Z protests are rooted in a combination of economic insecurity, political underrepresentation, expensive housing, difficult employment conditions, and perceptions of institutional failure. These grievances cross borders because young people in very different countries increasingly share concerns about their quality of life and future opportunities. Viewed through generational-cycle theory, these protests could represent the tensions of a wider period of crisis.
The Catalyst Effect - The underlying grievances alone do not explain why protests suddenly escalate, with specific catalysts turning broad dissatisfaction into mobilisation. From public-sector job quotas in Bangladesh and proposed tax increases in Kenya to social-media restrictions in Nepal and the Novi Sad railway-station collapse in Serbia, individual events have become symbols of wider systemic problems. In Albania, the tourism developments similarly became a focal point for concerns over corruption, economic opportunity, and the distribution of the country’s development.
Finding A Way Through - Resolving these tensions requires more than reacting to individual protests, with economic opportunity, education, institutional accountability, transparency, and political inclusion all requiring attention. Although catalysts cannot be predicted or prevented, addressing the underlying grievances could reduce the likelihood that individual events escalate into wider political crises. Ultimately, the current period of instability may represent a difficult stage through which societies learn how to build institutions and economies that allow younger generations to thrive.

Introduction

The recent protests in Albania occurred a few months ago, and despite coverage of this issue also peaking a few months ago, the situation remains ongoing. And so, we shall discuss it today.

What caused the recent protests in Albania, and what has unfolded in the last few months? Also, what underlying issues are leading to protests around the world today, and most importantly, can these issues be addressed? It’s these questions we’ll seek to answer today.

What Is Happening In Bosnia and Herzegovina?

Dylan Muggleton — Tue, 04 Aug 2026 07:10:43 GMT

Contents

Introduction
The History of Bosnia and Herzegovina
The Fight For Influence
The Crises
Where Do We Go From Here?
Concluding Remarks

Bitesize Edition

A Divided History - Bosnia and Herzegovina’s diverse population of Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats was shaped by centuries of competing empires and later by Yugoslavia. When Yugoslavia began to collapse in the 1990s, these divisions became increasingly political, with most Bosniaks and many Croats supporting independence while Bosnian-Serbs preferred remaining with Serbia in Yugoslavia. The resulting conflict made Bosnia one of the most volatile theatres of the Yugoslav Wars.
The Dayton System - The 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement ended the war but created a highly fragmented political system designed to prevent any ethnic group from dominating. Bosnia was divided into the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska, alongside complex state-level institutions including a three-member presidency and an international High Representative. This system has preserved the peace, but the competing centres of political power have also made effective governance extremely difficult.
The Constitutional Crisis - Tensions have increasingly centred on whether powers should remain with Republika Srpska and the Federation or be exercised by the wider Bosnian state. The 2025 constitutional crisis saw Republika Srpska attempt to limit the authority of Bosnian police and judicial institutions within its territory, while the removal of Milorad Dodik demonstrated the continuing power of the High Representative. With Christian Schmidt now gone and Louis Crishock acting as High Representative, the question of who will enforce the Dayton framework has become increasingly important.
A Divided West - The United States and European governments are now backing different candidates to become the next High Representative, reflecting wider disagreements over Bosnia’s future and the role of Western institutions. Washington’s support for Antonio Zanardi Landi could well be linked to the Southern Interconnection gas pipeline and a potentially more business-oriented approach, while European governments support René Troccaz and remain focused on Bosnia’s institutional development and EU aspirations. With the Peace Implementation Council unable to agree, the question now is whether a third candidate can break the deadlock or whether Western divisions will risk further weakening Bosnia’s political system.

Introduction

Last week we discussed Serbia and its current domestic political and geopolitical environment.

Today, we’re going to head over the border to a nation strongly connected to Serbia, both politically and geopolitically, that being Bosnia and Herzegovina.

What history brought us to the current environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina, how is the nation fractured politically, and where do we go from here? We’ll answer these questions and more today.

The History Of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Back in 2024, I did a deep-dive series on the history of the Balkans. It’s a region that is often overlooked geopolitically, but its history is deep, and the effects of the past continue to ripple throughout many of the Balkan nations today.

Bosnia and Herzegovina was contested for centuries, largely between the Ottoman Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

As a result of this rich history, Bosnia has three major ethnic communities, those being the Bosniaks, the Serbs, and the Croats. Bosnia and Herzegovina is so interesting in comparison to its neighbours because none of these groups formed a majority.

Yugoslavia was an attempt to create a country that “represented” all of these groups, but this actually came in the form of political suppression, which saw reduced nationalism.

During this period of suppression, Bosnia remained diverse. It’s this history, the fall of Tito, and these ethnic groups that contributed to the Yugoslav Wars in the 1990s, as nations surrounding Bosnia and Herzegovina viewed it as a nation to be influenced and controlled.

Slovenia and Croatia declared independence in 1991, but Bosnia’s independence was more complicated due to the diverse ethnic makeup. As a result, Bosnia experienced a more volatile period during these conflicts.

Within Bosnia, most Bosniaks and many Croats supported independence, while the Bosnian-Serbs preferred remaining with Serbia in Yugoslavia.

Photo by Annie Spratt on Unsplash

An independence referendum in 1992 was boycotted by Bosnian-Serbs, and the conflict commenced shortly after.

The Fight For Influence

In 1995, the Dayton Peace Agreement ended the conflict.

In the aftermath of the Bosnian War, the fighting ended, but politically, the system in Bosnia and Herzegovina was fragmented to ensure no ethnic group could dominate.

This saw the nation divided into two entities:

The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina - Mainly Bosniaks and Croats.
Republika Srpska - A Serb-majority population.

This system of power sharing remains today, stopping the war, but creating an institutional architecture that makes governance difficult.

The two entities are largely autonomous, with a national parliament with veto powers, a constitutional court, and an international High Representative that has the authority to impose laws and dismiss officials within the nation.

It also sees a three-member rotating presidency, including one Bosniak, one Serb, and one Croat.

The current status in the national parliament and the role of the High Representative have both caused recent crises to emerge in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Photo by ADEV on Unsplash

The Crises

Firstly, we’ll discuss the High Representative. They possess the Bonn Powers. This allows them to impose laws, remove officials, break political deadlocks, and ensure the Dayton Peace Agreement is adhered to.

The United States and Europe have largely agreed to support the Office of the High Representative in the past. However, more recently, it appears that the slow split between Europe and the United States in some aspects of geopolitics has spread to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The former High Representative, Christian Schmidt, stepped down on July 1st, 2026. Interestingly, it was Schmidt who stepped in to shut down Republika Srpska separatist discussions by former President Milorad Dodik. This eventually led to Dodik being removed by the High Representative in Republika Srpska last September. However, the Trump Administration stepped in, dropped sanctions on Dodik placed during the Biden Administration. This saw the political apparatus that had supported Dodik survive, with current President Sinisa Karan from the same party as Dodik.

The 2025 constitutional crisis involving Republika Srpska saw the territory pass legislation that attempted to limit Bosnian police and the judicial system from operating in the territory. This went against the Dayton framework, and highlights that this isn’t only a question of who will be the next High Representative, but also where, and for how long, this constitutional crisis will take Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Currently, U.S. diplomat Louis Crishock is acting High Representative until a permanent replacement is chosen.

Photo by Nik Shuliahin 💛💙 on Unsplash

This is because the United States is pushing for Antonio Zanardi Landi to become High Representative. He is an Italian diplomat and a former ambassador to Russia and Serbia. Notably, he has no previous experience with Bosnia, and being a former Ambassador to Serbia, this could be an unpopular move amongst Bosniaks and Croat populations in Bosnia.

On the other side, the Europeans are pushing for René Troccaz to become High Representative. He is the French’s special envoy to the Western Balkans.

And so, before exploring where we go from here, we need to ask why the United States and Europe are both pushing for separate candidates?

The Trump Administration is seemingly pushing for a business-led agenda in Bosnia through the High Representative. We’ve seen the effects this has had in Albania recently, surrounding Jared Kushner’s project, which led to huge protests. In Bosnia, where the political system is more fragile, such effects could cause extensive damage to the environment that was established after Dayton in 1995.

Specifically, it appears the United States is interested in the gas pipeline contract, the Southern Interconnection. This project has been awarded to AAFS Infrastructure and Energy. The company has little infrastructure experience, but personal connections to Trump.

Photo by Darren Halstead on Unsplash

And so, behind the Trump Administration’s push for “open-ended institution building” in the Balkans appears to be Trump’s potential pursuit of business deals, at the expense of institutional strength in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Europe is against such U.S. hopes because of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s EU aspirations. Any moves that undermine institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina risk slowing or reversing any effort made up to this point. Also, the EU is worried that around one-third of the pipeline would be built on state land.

This was an issue that wasn’t solved after the war. Dodik insists that everything on Republika Srpska land should belong to them, and not the wider Bosnian state. If the U.S-supported Landi became High Representative, one possible scenario is the issuance of a special law which would divide property between the two entities of Republika Srpska and the Federation. Landi has never discussed this, but it’s reported that AAFS has said Landi will address the issue of state land if elected as High Representative.

And so, where do we go from here? Will the United States win, and get their candidate, or will Europe stand firm? More importantly, how will this affect Bosnia and Herzegovina?

Where Do We Go From Here?

The key aspect to consider here is whether the United States can pressure Europe enough to back down from their support of Troccaz.

The United States has said it will “reconsider its role in the current international presence”. This is likely referring to the Trump Administration openly pressuring and pulling back from Europe. This has seen Europe openly pursuing rearmament, and many other changes, after it’s been made clear that the United States’ support of Europe could be volatile and unreliable. I’d expect this trend to continue. In the short-term, this will hurt Europe, but in the long-term, it will boost resiliency, which is necessary in our fragmented geopolitical world.

Other alternative scenarios are that Europe gathers around Troccaz and doesn’t buckle under pressure, or an alternative candidate is chosen. Also, we could remain in this stalemate for some time.

Photo by Christophe Hautier on Unsplash

For Bosnians especially, the collapse of U.S. and European collective support is an issue. Dayton has kept the peace in Bosnia since the end of the conflict in 1995. Without cohesive support, could we see political pressure spike, and from there, could this turn into something worse?

Bosnia and Herzegovina is a state, but will these entities continue to battle for these delegated powers, or should power be collected in Sarajevo?

Concluding Remarks

The Peace Implementation Council held a meeting on July 14th, but they could not agree on a new High Representative. For now, the stalemate continues, but reports indicate that Europe is searching for an alternative candidate. Hence, this scenario is growing increasingly likely. But after this, will the deadlock be broken, or will both sides return to a stalemate?

What is clear is that the system after 1995 produced a permanent political struggle. As each side makes moves, will the system hold, or will this Western fracturing lead to weakened governance and dramatic changes? We’ll keep up to date with these events in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

On Thursday, I’ll discuss the recent protests in Albania. I also want to discuss the current political environment in Kosovo in the coming weeks. Keep an eye out for those discussions if they sound of interest to you.

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Sources:

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jun/30/eu-diplomats-clash-with-trump-administration-over-top-bosnia-and-herzegovina-post
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jun/30/europe-us-high-representative-for-bosnia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025%E2%80%9326_Republika_Srpska_presidential_election
https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2026/07/14/still-no-agreement-on-the-new-high-representative-for-bosnia-and-herzegovina/

Velina Tchakarova

Who Protects Whom

The question dominating every serious conversation about European enlargement is posed backwards. Policymakers keep asking whether bringing Ukraine, Moldova, and the Western Balkans into the European Union would make Europe stronger or leave it more exposed. The framing assumes that enlargement is something Europe does for these candidate states, a gene…

2 months ago · 16 likes · 1 comment · Velina Tchakarova

This Week In Geopolitics - 2nd August 2026

Dylan Muggleton — Mon, 03 Aug 2026 00:50:21 GMT

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Africa

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Asia

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Europe

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Middle East

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North America

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South America

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Other

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The Global Questions Series - Number 32: The Gap Between Games and Reality

Dylan Muggleton — Thu, 30 Jul 2026 17:32:37 GMT

Contents

Introduction
Game Theory and Geopolitics
How Game Theory Can Differ From Reality
Concluding Remarks

Bitesize Edition

Game Theory Is a Powerful Lens - Game theory helps us analyse geopolitics by focusing on incentives, objectives, and strategic interactions rather than political rhetoric alone. It explains why states respond to one another in particular ways and provides a structured framework for thinking about international affairs. However, it is only a model, meaning reality often differs from its assumptions.
Uncertainty Shapes Geopolitics - The greatest limitation of game theory is uncertainty. Leaders are not perfectly rational, information is often incomplete or deliberately manipulated, and governments rarely know the true capabilities or intentions of their rivals. These factors make geopolitical forecasting far more complex than theoretical models suggest.
Psychology and Strategy Matter - States do not always pursue the highest theoretical payoff because leaders weigh factors such as risk, reputation, ideology, and domestic political pressures differently. In some cases, unpredictability itself becomes the optimal strategy, making it harder for rivals to anticipate future actions. This helps explain why countries can behave in ways that appear irrational despite acting strategically.
No Single Framework Is Enough - Modern geopolitics involves countless interacting actors, changing incentives, and feedback loops that continually reshape the strategic environment. Small decisions can trigger major consequences, while economic crises, elections, and conflicts can fundamentally alter the game itself. Game theory is therefore most effective when combined with history, economics, psychology, and domestic political analysis to build a more complete picture of world affairs.

Introduction

We frequently view geopolitical issues through the lens of game theory. One reason that this lens is so useful is that geopolitics is a never-ending string of interactions. If we use game theory, we can analyse how nations are incentivised to act in response to these constant interactions.

If we only use what geopolitical actors say in speeches to attempt to predict geopolitical interactions, we can see nations say one thing and pursue another thing entirely. This is because if we only analyse rhetoric, we don’t consider what goals geopolitical actors could be pursuing. We also don’t consider alternative strategies and incentives that could drive their behaviour, among many other aspects of geopolitics.

So, game theory can often produce better psychological and geopolitical forecasting. However, only using game theory is also an imperfect method. There can be flaws in this approach. And so we need to plug these gaps where game theory is weaker, and to do this we need to be aware of them. It’s this idea that we’ll discuss today in the Global Questions Series. Where can game theory let us down, and how can we address these weaknesses? Let’s dive in.

What Is Happening In Serbia?

Dylan Muggleton — Tue, 28 Jul 2026 01:38:44 GMT

Contents

Introduction
Updates In Serbia
Why Now?
Will Vučić Truly Resign?
A Balancing Act
Concluding Remarks

Bitesize Edition

Political Uncertainty - Serbia could be heading towards early presidential and parliamentary elections after President Aleksander Vučić stated he intends to resign in the near future. While this has yet to happen, speculation has grown that he could instead seek the role of Prime Minister, allowing him to retain power at the centre of Serbian politics.
Growing Domestic Pressure - The ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) has faced increasing pressure following the 2024 Novi Sad railway station roof collapse, which triggered mass anti-corruption protests led largely by students. Polling suggests government support has weakened amongst the youth, while opposition-backed student movements have gained momentum. This force could potentially encourage the government to call elections sooner rather than later.
A Strategic Balancing Act - Geopolitically, Serbia continues balancing its long-term ambition of joining the European Union with its political and energy ties to Russia. While EU membership negotiations remain ongoing, issues including Kosovo, rule of law, and media freedom continue to complicate the accession process.
Why Serbia Matters - Serbia remains one of the most influential countries in the Balkans, with developments in Belgrade shaping the wider geopolitical environment across Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Montenegro. As domestic political uncertainty continues alongside geopolitical issues, Serbia’s future direction will remain one of the region’s most important to watch.

Introduction

We last discussed the Balkans back in February 2025.

As a result of this long gap, an update is long overdue. The region remains one of Europe’s most sensitive regions geopolitically, with history, politics, superpower influence, and territorial disputes continuing to shape the region.

And so, today, we’ll discuss Serbia’s political environment, whether the current president will resign, what this could lead to, and key aspects of Serbia on the geopolitical stage. Let’s dive in below.

Updates In Serbia

We recently saw news emerge of Serbian President Aleksander Vučić’s supposed imminent resignation. He stated on June 27th that he will resign within weeks to pave the way for early presidential and parliamentary elections. A month later, this hasn’t yet occurred, but Bloomberg reported an election will occur in Serbia between September and November.

Vučić has served in the role since 2017 and is currently in his second term and final term as President, which will reach its end in March 2027 if Vučić doesn’t resign.

Parliamentary elections will also occur in 2027, with elections held every four years, and the previous elections held in 2023. The current National Assembly, which has 250 seats, sees the Serbia Must Not Stop Party possess 129 seats. This is the parliamentary group led by the Serbian Progressive Party under Vučić.

These election rules are per the Serbian constitution, which was adopted in 2006 after the dissolution of Serbia and Montenegro in the same year.

So, the first question to consider is why would Vučić resign now?

Why Now?

One key dataset which we can look at is polling data. Within Serbia, polling has recently been fragmented, depending on the source.

Photo by Dimitrije Milenkovic on Unsplash

Independent media and the political opposition often accuse polling agencies Ispos and Faktor Plus of leaning towards the preference of the current government. But, despite these accusations, political shifts are visible in data that is coming out of Serbia across a range of sources.

A poll published by CRTA in July of 2026 saw the first time that the SNS didn’t take first place in national polling since July 2010. This declining trend has been seen since a publisher, Nova Srpska Politicka Misao (NSPM), started conducting polling through two joint lists. One list is an SNS-led list, and the other is a student list. NSPM then combined these lists, leading to a percentage of support for and against the current government. Since this list was established, the opposition has polled above the current government by around 10%. This highlights that students and youth are currently more opposed to the current government than in support of it.

And this trend has been growing. In the 2023 election, SNS received 48.1% of the total vote. Throughout 2024, into 2025, and now in 2026, their polling data has seen some dips, with the lowest being in March and June of 2025, where the SNS polled at 36% and 35.1%, respectively. It is notable that this is when the student list was first introduced.

The current government could look at this trend and see that calling an earlier election would benefit them if it wouldn’t allow more time for this potential trend to take hold.

So, this could explain why Vučić could resign now. But the important question is, if he does, why would he be incentivised to pursue such a move?

Photo by Maksim Samuilionak on Unsplash

Will Vučić Truly Resign?

Firstly, it’s notable that, under a Presidential resignation, an election would occur within three months. This would support the theory that the ruling government would like an election sooner rather than later. But there’s more nuance to the current domestic political system in Serbia.

Serbia is a parliamentary republic under a dual system. The President serves as head of state, which involves representing the country, commanding the armed forces, and determining foreign policy.

The Prime Minister leads the government, sets domestic policies, executes laws, and makes economic decisions. Most importantly, the Prime Minister is nominated by the President, before needing a majority vote of approval in the single-chamber 250-seat National Assembly.

As per the constitution, the President usually has little power, and the position is ceremonial, but Vučić currently operates in a de facto sense in a semi-presidential system. It’s also relevant that Vučić is in his second presidential term, which is the limit as per the constitution.

And so, the expectation by some is that Vučić will resign as President, and aim for the role of Prime Minister. The ruling Serbia Must Not Stop, led by the Serbia Progressive Party (SNS), has stated they want Vučić as their leader in the next parliamentary election, and that they would elect him as Prime Minister if they won.

Photo by Evgeny Smirnov on Unsplash

Leader of the Serbia Must Not Stop party, Milos Vucevic, who was the Prime Minister until Duro Macut succeeded him in April 2025, said: “We see him (Vučić) as our candidate for Prime Minister. It’s up to him to accept or decline.” This would see Vučić remain in power, despite a move from president to prime minister.

Of course, as we discussed back in 2025, these events are unfolding with the November 2024 Novi Sad railway station roof collapse still in recent memory, which took 15 lives. This has led to large protests in the last few years, especially involving students, but also farmers and lawyers.

These protests then expanded, with protestors aiming at political corruption within the nation. But the underlying demands seemed to be government accountability, and the youth questioning the ruling SNS.

Red paint was thrown at the city hall entrance in Novi Sad, and police responded with tear gas and arrests. Also, members of the Faculty of Dramatic Arts in Belgrade were attacked by an organised group. The largest protest that occurred during this period reportedly had over 100,000 people in attendance. This period also led to strikes within Serbia.

These protests reached a critical point when people were attacked in January 2025 in Novi Sad while putting up posters. These attackers were masked and possessed baseball bats. The social media outrage and new protests led to former Prime Minister Milos Vucevic resigning, as well as Novi Sad mayor Milan Duric.

Photo by Lazar Gugleta on Unsplash

Vučić then made concessions, pardoning protestors and undergoing a major governmental cabinet reshuffle. He also said he was “considering calling elections”, and then provided higher education with 12.01 billion Serbian dinars. These concessions fulfilled some of the demands that students were making during this period of protest.

And so, if we flash forward to today once again, how has this recent news of a potential Vučić resignation been received?

Well, those involved in these protests have remained largely silent regarding these political developments in Serbia. But, as seen previously, they can clearly withdraw some government concessions.

And so, is the student-led group a large enough influence to lead to political shifts in Serbia via a Vučić resignation? Time will tell, perhaps in the next few weeks if Vučić’s word is to be believed.

If Vučić does resign, it would appear that the ruling system in Serbia, or Vučić himself, would be incentivised to do so now, rather than later, potentially due to this student-led movement being considered a potential threat.

Now, to zoom out from domestic politics in Serbia, it’s also interesting how Serbia connects to the wider Europe, specifically with accession to the European Union.

A Balancing Act

Serbia is often seen as undergoing a balancing act between Europe to its West, and Russia to its East.

Serbia applied to join the European Union in 2009, and has been a candidate since 2012. Negotiations that started in 2014 remain ongoing. Vučić stated in 2024 that Serbia would hit all the criteria to join the EU by 2028. Hitting the criteria would then lead to a target of 2029 or 2030 for joining the EU officially.

Photo by Christian Lue on Unsplash

However, key issues remain. Serbia would have to recognise Kosovo as a state, while rule of law, media freedom, and relations with Russia also remain obstacles.

Serbia has refused to join sanctions against Russia. This is likely contributed to by energy reliance, with between 80% and 90% of Serbia’s gas imports coming from Gazprom via the Balkan Stream pipeline.

Serbia has started other projects to diversify supplies, including with Azerbaijan and the EU, but this dependence remains today. Also, Serbia has the Petroleum Industry of Serbia (NIS), which has been sanctioned in the past by the United States due to the fact that it is majority-owned by Gazprom. This energy dependence likely remains a key part of the calculus of Serbia’s balancing act. The EU, being Serbia’s largest trading partner and investment source, will contribute even further to this balancing act, and these aspects will continue to do so.

Serbia also remains relevant regionally in the geopolitical environments in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Montenegro. It’s this that we’ll discuss next Monday, with us returning to the Global Questions Series this coming Thursday.

Concluding Remarks

The impacts of the Balkan Wars in the 1990s are still visible in Sarajevo and Mostar. Kosovo, despite growing more recognised by its neighbours in some aspects, remains deeply involved in territorial disputes. And Montenegro’s separation from Serbia in 2006 was only 20 years ago. These forces, and many more, continue to lead to shifts in the Balkans. The region is interconnected, and so their futures will see these nations continue to influence and interact with each other. Serbia remains central to this, which we’ll explore in more detail next week. Keep an eye out if that sounds of interest to you.

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Sources:

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-05-21/serbia-s-vucic-seeks-early-election-in-fall-in-protest-response
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Serbia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Serbia_Must_Not_Stop
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accession_of_Serbia_to_the_European_Union
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opinion_polling_for_the_next_Serbian_parliamentary_election

This Week In Geopolitics - 25th July 2026

Dylan Muggleton — Sat, 25 Jul 2026 10:23:29 GMT

Photo by Roman Kraft on Unsplash

Note: The News Review is a day early this week. I’ll be on a flight tomorrow, and so I wanted to release the post while I had the time. Any news from Sunday will be included with next week’s edition of the News Review.

Africa

Trump Admin Weighing Military Intervention In Mali

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Asia

Photo by shalender kumar on Unsplash

Europe

Photo by Evgenii Zolotarev on Unsplash

Middle East

Photo by Ahmad Mohammed on Unsplash

North America

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Other

Photo by Aldebaran S on Unsplash

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More Developments In Syria, Iraq, and Beyond

Dylan Muggleton — Thu, 23 Jul 2026 12:42:10 GMT

Contents

Introduction
Is Syria Emerging As A Stable Middle-Eastern Nation?
What Is Unfolding In Iraq?
The Kurds In The Middle East
Concluding Remarks

Bitesize Edition

Syria’s Geopolitical Shift - Syria is undergoing one of the most significant geopolitical transformations in the Middle East following the collapse of the Assad Regime. The nation is increasingly moving away from Russian and Iranian influence while developing closer ties with Western nations, energy companies, and regional partners. However, tensions remain due to Israeli and Turkish security concerns, Iranian-aligned militias, and the continued threat from groups such as ISIS.
Iraq’s Battle For Influence - Iraq is becoming another key arena in the competition between the United States and Iran, with Washington attempting to weaken Iranian-backed militias within the country. The new Iraqi government has taken steps against groups such as the Popular Mobilisation Forces and is attempting to increase state control over armed factions. However, Iraq’s importance as an energy hub and its reliance on U.S. dollars mean geopolitical pressure from both sides will continue.
The Kurdish Question - The Kurds remain one of the most important geopolitical groups in the Middle East, spread across Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Their relationship with each country differs, with Iraqi Kurds enjoying significant autonomy while Syrian Kurds negotiate their future integration into the state. As tensions between the United States and Iran continue, Kurdish groups may become increasingly relevant due to their historical ties with Washington and opposition to Tehran.
The Future Middle East Balance - The future trajectory of Syria, Iraq, and the Kurds will largely depend on the broader competition between the United States, Iran, Israel, and Turkey. Energy corridors, military influence, and control over strategic geography will shape how these nations develop in the coming years. While recent shifts suggest declining Iranian regional influence, ongoing conflicts and competing interests mean instability remains a major risk.

Introduction

On Monday, we established the key role Israel is playing in the future trajectory of both Palestine and Lebanon.

Today, we’ll explore the geopolitical direction of Syria, Iraq, and the Kurds. Will Israel have a similar effect on these nations, or will other geopolitical actors be more influential on these nations? Also, where do these nations find themselves individually? What are their goals, and biggest issues they face? Let’s discuss below.

Developments In Gaza, The West Bank and Lebanon

Dylan Muggleton — Mon, 20 Jul 2026 13:26:38 GMT

Contents

Introduction
What Is Happening In Palestine?
Developments In Lebanon
Concluding Remarks

Bitesize Edition

Palestine’s Ongoing Crisis - The situation in Palestine remains unstable despite the existence of a ceasefire agreement in Gaza, with continued Israeli military operations and ongoing disputes over withdrawal and governance. In the West Bank, settlement expansion, displacement, and settler violence continue to shape the geopolitical environment. With reconstruction costs estimated at tens of billions of dollars, rebuilding Gaza remains unlikely without a significant political breakthrough.
Israel’s Strategy In Gaza - Israel continues to pursue a strategy focused on security control, limiting Hamas, and maintaining influence over territory in Gaza and the West Bank. Hamas has refused to disarm, while Israel has continued targeting the group’s leadership and maintaining its military position. The future of Palestinian governance remains uncertain as both Israeli and Palestinian political structures could undergo significant changes before the end of the year.
Lebanon And Hezbollah’s Decline - Lebanon is experiencing a major shift as Hezbollah’s political and military influence declines following years as Iran’s most powerful regional proxy. The Lebanese government, Israel, and the United States are all seeking to reduce Hezbollah’s armed capabilities, while Hezbollah continues to reject demands to disarm or withdraw north of the Litani River. However, the group remains embedded within Lebanese politics and society, meaning tensions and potential clashes could continue.
The Wider Iran-Israel Competition - Developments in Palestine and Lebanon are closely connected to the wider competition between Israel, the United States, and Iran across the Middle East. Weakening Hamas and Hezbollah reduces Iran’s ability to project power through regional allies, while also reshaping the balance of influence across the region. However, unresolved conflicts, territorial disputes, and competing security objectives mean instability will likely remain.

Introduction

Last week, I explored the history behind the rise and fall of Iran’s land bridge. Now that this history has been explored, we can return to the present day.

Today, we’ll explore the geopolitical environments within Lebanon and Palestine, as well as important geopolitical trends and narratives that each is currently experiencing. I’ll also discuss Iraq, Syria, and the Kurds on Thursday, along with the geopolitical interactions they have with others in the region, and their biggest goals and issues. But for today, let’s dive in.

What Is Happening In Palestine?

Despite a “ceasefire” that still exists in Gaza from October 2025, it has had little effect on halting Israeli strikes. Two days ago, Israeli attacks on residential areas in Gaza saw eight people die. Three days ago, Israeli attacks killed 14, including some attending a funeral. Also, as a part of the “ceasefire”, Israel would have to withdraw from Gaza. But, back in December, Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz stated the military would “never leave all of Gaza”. Katz has since pushed to establish military outposts in Northern Gaza, which would see Israel maintain an armed presence in Gaza, while also controlling territory. Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich has echoed similar comments. This is a move Israel has pursued in Lebanon and Syria, as we’ll discuss later.

What should be celebrated is the hostage releases, which did occur after the framework from October 2025. But the postponement of the agreement has seen few other positives develop. The main issue remains the lack of an answer to political questions, such as a future environment for Israel and Palestine.

In the West Bank, Palestinians continue to be injured in attacks. The settlements continue to expand in the West Bank, with Israel recently approving 34 new settlements. This is despite Israeli settlements on Palestinian land being illegal under international law. Also, Palestinians have been denied return to West Bank camps when their homes have been destroyed. This is creating and reinforcing an environment where living in Gaza and the West Bank is growing more difficult for Palestinians. This pushes Palestinians to leave, if they can, while Israel continues to take control of more territory.

The same events that were unfolding during the period when the Gaza conflict was taking headlines continue to unfold today. The main difference is that these events now receive much less coverage. Because of reduced coverage coming out of Gaza, Israel has approved two moves in recent months that didn’t receive much attention.

Photo by Mohammed Ibrahim on Unsplash

The first was the Israeli plan for prisons exclusively for Palestinians. These prisons would be surrounded by crocodiles, drawing comparisons to the “Alligator Alcatraz” site used by ICE in the United States.

The second move saw Israel approve the death penalty for Palestinians convicted of acts of terrorism. This move saw widespread condemnation, notably from the United Nations and the European Union, who warned that any discriminatory application of this rule would constitute a war crime.

As for Hamas, the group refuses to disarm, which, alongside Israeli refusal to withdraw, has seen the “peace plan” stagnate. Israeli strikes continue to target Hamas leadership, with the IDF taking out a top Hamas moneyman and claiming to take out a top military commander in recent months.

Politically, the Israeli elections are set to be one of the biggest election stories of this year, alongside the U.S. midterms, with the Israeli Knesset dissolving last week. But the Hamas government has also dissolved in Gaza. The reaction to this move was varied. The Israelis believe this is a stunt, while the Palestinian Authority stated this would lead to November elections for Palestinians. The two elections have the potential to lead to some political shifts in Israel and Palestine in the latter months of this year. The power and direction of these moves, however, are unpredictable.

Currently, these moves are unfolding with little attention. This is worrying because the current trend paints a picture of a worsening situation for Palestinian citizens.

The UN and EU have stated that Gaza will need $71B over the next decade to be rebuilt. With the “ceasefire” not making forward progress, and with Palestinians being displaced both in Gaza and the West Bank, such a rebuild unfortunately seems like a distant outcome. Also, the current environment is not improving for Palestinians.

Photo by David McLenachan on Unsplash

Developments In Lebanon

The Israelis also remain active in Lebanon. Currently, Israeli forces occupy territory in southern Lebanon, with their stated aim being security.

As part of the Israeli operation in Lebanon, they have been destroying bridges, which implies they wish to hold this buffer zone for some time. In fact, Israel Katz has stated that Israel intends to hold this territory in Lebanon for the foreseeable future.

The status of Hezbollah in Lebanon, its interactions with Israel, and its strength as an Iranian proxy group are key features in the current narratives unfolding in Lebanon.

The Israelis and Lebanese governments signed a deal that would see Hezbollah disarm and move north of the Litani River. In return, Israel would then withdraw. This was based on UN Resolution 1701.

https://cdn.britannica.com/31/262931-050-EC5E9983/litani-river-lebanon-locator.jpg

Hezbollah has continued to reject both disarmament and moving north of the Litani. The group has also had supporters protest in the streets in Lebanon, while also encircling government buildings.

What is clear is that Hezbollah has lost political and military strength in Lebanon over the last few years. Politically, Lebanon formed a new government in 2025. This new leadership has sought to strengthen the Lebanese Armed Forces and reduce the role of armed groups, including Hezbollah.

Lebanese President Joseph Aoun has accused Iran of using Lebanon as a bargaining chip in its support for Hezbollah. So this hope for a Hezbollah with reduced power isn’t only a goal of the Israelis and the United States, but also the government in Lebanon.

Last week, we discussed the fall of Iran’s land bridge of influence. Hezbollah was and remains one of the key pieces of Iran’s period of peak influence.

This is why the Israelis continue to target Hezbollah. The Israelis see Iran as an existential threat, and that includes their proxy groups, which act as security threats to Israel.

The current trend is seeing Hezbollah’s power decline, and this is why Iran is stating that any peace deal with the United States is conditional on peace in Lebanon. This would allow Hezbollah to rest and recuperate. The question is whether they have the potential to regrow. Politically, it would seem not, but militarily? As we discussed last week, the Iranian’s internal environment is also fragile. Do they have the capabilities to support Hezbollah, especially with the land bridge declining across Iraq and Syria?

Photo by Sara Calado on Unsplash

In recent months, Israel has targeted Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem, and they have hit an underground drone complex. As long as the conflict between the United States and Iran continues, I’d expect the Israelis to continue to make moves to weaken Hezbollah. Aggressive moves against Hezbollah reduce the direct security threat to Northern Israel, while also limiting Iran’s ability to disrupt Israel from a distance.

Even if the conflict between the United States and Iran does end, Israel has stated it will maintain this buffer zone. As a result, clashes with Hezbollah will remain if Hezbollah is in a position to continue to clash.

If Hezbollah does remain in a position to fight and pursue instability, there does exist a domestic risk in Lebanon. Could Hezbollah and government forces clash, seeing Lebanon enter into a period of civil war, for example?

The aim of the current government is a political settlement, but Hezbollah doesn’t seem open to this. They retain seats in parliament, and their system of tunnels is extensive and shrouded in secrecy. It’s likely that Hezbollah will not disappear in the near term, and this has the potential to see tensions remain. The key question is the format of these tensions. Will it see the status quo maintained of Israeli operations to weaken Hezbollah, which responds with intermittent attacks, or will the situation escalate? My base case is the status quo remaining, with Israel’s security buffer zone, and the weakening of Hezbollah continuing, but all scenarios should be considered.

Concluding Remarks

I aimed to discuss Palestine and Lebanon alongside Syria, Iraq, and the Kurds today. However, there are many developments unfolding under the radar for each of these geopolitical actors. And so, on Thursday, we’ll separately explore developments in Syria, Iraq, and with the Kurds. Keep an eye out for that release on Thursday if it sounds of interest to you.

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Sources:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Aoun
https://zeteo.com/t/gaza
https://www.newarab.com/analysis/does-gazas-international-stabilisation-force-have-future
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/11/18/what-is-the-international-stabilisation-force-for-gaza
https://carnegieendowment.org/middle-east/diwan/2026/06/board-up-trumps-failed-board-of-peace
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/mar/30/israel-passes-law-death-penalty-palestinian-convicted-terrorists
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2026/07/17/israel-alligator-alcatraz-palestinians-jail-crocodile/
https://www.aljazeera.com/where/lebanon
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/7/19/from-settlements-to-blocked-recovery-israeli-strategy-taking-shape-in-gaza

This Week In Geopolitics - 19th July 2026

Dylan Muggleton — Sun, 19 Jul 2026 10:48:53 GMT

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Africa

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Asia

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Europe

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Middle East

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North America

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Oceania

Australia Introduces Power, Water, and Copyright Rules On Data Centres

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Other

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The Fall of Iran's Land Bridge of Influence

Dylan Muggleton — Thu, 16 Jul 2026 11:14:24 GMT

Contents

Introduction
The Decline of Iran’s Land Bridge
Has The Bridge Collapsed?
Concluding Remarks

Bitesize Edition

Iran’s Influence Has Weakened - Iran’s regional influence peaked between 2017 and 2022, but a series of geopolitical events has steadily eroded its position. Russia’s focus on Ukraine reduced its ability to support Syria, while Israel adopted a more aggressive strategy to weaken Iranian-backed groups. Together, these shifts have undermined the foundations of Iran’s regional network.
The Land Bridge Has Broken Down - The collapse of the Assad regime in late 2024 removed the central link connecting Iran to Lebanon through Syria. This has made it much harder for Tehran to supply Hezbollah, its most powerful proxy. At the same time, Syria has become a new arena for competition between Turkey and Israel, leaving Iran with far less room to rebuild its influence.
Iran Still Has Regional Leverage - Despite these setbacks, Iran continues to influence the Middle East through Iraqi militias, the Houthis, and Hezbollah, among others. It also retains the ability to disrupt global energy markets by threatening the Strait of Hormuz, giving it significant short-term leverage. However, domestic challenges such as inflation, water shortages, and economic pressures will reduce its capacity to sustain these relationships over the long term.
The Long-Term Trend Favours Decline - While Iran can still create regional instability, the broader trajectory points towards a gradual loss of influence over time. Rebuilding its former land bridge would require stronger domestic foundations, which don’t currently exist. Unless the regional balance changes dramatically, Iran’s geopolitical reach is likely to continue shrinking over the long term.

Introduction

On Monday, we set the stage by discussing the rise and peak of Iran’s influence in the Middle East. This spanned from Tehran, through Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, and onto the Mediterranean.

However, this environment existed between 2017 and 2022. Since then, the Middle East has shifted dramatically. And so, today, we’re going to explore how Iranian influence has declined across the Middle East, and if this influence still exists at all today.

The Rise of Iran's Land Bridge of Influence In The Middle East

Dylan Muggleton — Mon, 13 Jul 2026 18:50:58 GMT

Contents

Introduction
The Origins of Iranian Influence
The Rise of Iran’s Land Bridge
The Status of The Bridge Today
Concluding Remarks

Bitesize Edition

From Revolution to Regional Influence - Iran’s regional strategy began after the 1979 Iranian Revolution, when it sought to expand its influence beyond its borders. Alliances with Syria and the creation of Hezbollah provided Tehran with its first reliable partners. Over the following decades, these relationships became the foundations of what would later become known as Iran’s land bridge.
Building the Land Bridge - The 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, followed by the Arab Spring and Syrian Civil War, created opportunities for Iran to deepen its regional influence. Through allied governments, militia groups, and logistical routes, Tehran established a corridor stretching from Iran through Iraq and Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Between 2017 and 2022, this network represented the peak of Iranian influence in the Middle East.
A Regional Network - Beyond Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, Iran also developed relationships with Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Houthis to project influence across the region. These groups gave Tehran strategic leverage while allowing it a degree of deniability over regional conflicts. However, by 2026, what had once been a coherent corridor had become a fragmented network of less connected allies.
The Limits of Geopolitical Power - Iran’s land bridge demonstrates that geopolitical influence is never permanent. Decisions such as the 2003 removal of Saddam Hussein reshaped the region in many ways, creating opportunities for Iran while generating new long-term challenges. The rise and decline of Iran’s land bridge highlights how alliances, power, and regional influence can shift dramatically as geopolitical conditions evolve.

Introduction

Over the last few decades, Iran has accumulated influence in many of the nations in the Middle East. Specifically, this saw Iran expand influence across the border into Iraq, into Syria with the Assad Regime, and into Lebanon through Hezbollah.

Iran also sought to gain influence through other proxy groups outside of the land bridge, including Hamas in Gaza and the Houthis in Yemen. These widespread groups saw Iran exert influence across the entire region of the Middle East.

However, today, Iranian influence in many of these nations has declined. And so, in today’s discussion, we’ll explore the rise, the peak, and the recent fall of Iran’s land bridge, and its influence across the wider Middle East region.

The Origins of Iranian Influence

The rise of Iran’s influence in the Middle East can be traced back to the Iranian Revolution. The uprising, which started in 1978, culminated in 1979 with the collapse of the monarchy. To protect the new government, we then saw the creation of the IRGC. This marked the beginning of a shift in Iran’s foreign policy, which was, in part, due to Iran wanting to remove Western influence. The Iranians then also moved to influence the region around them.

But, before this, some conditions in the Middle East immediately benefited the new Iranian Regime after the Revolution.

The Assad regime began in 1970, when Hafez al-Assad seized power from the other groups within the ruling Ba’ath Party through a coup. This then became known as the “Corrective Revolution”, with Assad purging and restructuring the Ba’ath Party and state institutions.

Before the Iranian Revolution, Iran and Syria were rivals. Syria was aligned with the Soviet Union and opposed Israel, while Iran, under the Shah, was pro-Western and had close ties to the United States and, hence, Israel.

After the Revolution, both nations shared similar enemies, including Israel, the United States, Iraq under Saddam Hussein, and the Arab monarchies, such as Saudi Arabia.

During the Iran-Iraq War, when Iraq invaded Iran in September 1980, Syria was the exception in the region for their support of Iran. This led to cooperation between Syria and Iran. The Iran-Iraq War eventually ended in August 1988 in an inconclusive state. Notably, Iraq used chemical weapons in Iran, which is relevant later when the United States got involved in the region against Iraq.

Photo by Saad Salim on Unsplash

In 1982, we saw the Second Israeli invasion of Lebanon. This conflict took place between June and September of 1982, with the Israelis invading Southern Lebanon to take on the Palestine Liberation Organisation, which was operating in the region at the time. The Israeli operation was triggered by an attempted assassination of Shlomo Argov, Israel’s ambassador to the UK, by the Abu Nidal Organisation. This was a group that broke away from Fatah.

Hezbollah then emerged in the aftermath of this conflict. This was supported by the Iranians deploying members of the IRGC to Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley. The Iranians had also established logistics through Syria by this time, but they had little direct influence inside Syria itself. In fact, at this time, Syria and Iraq were the two nations that were essentially competing for leadership of the Arab world. Iran, while being at war with Iraq, was naturally worried about their neighbour over the border, and thus supported Syria.

Hezbollah was Iranian-backed, and they continued to fight with the Israelis in Lebanon until the IDF finally withdrew in 2000. Syria was also involved in this conflict, due to the Syrian Army occupying northeast Lebanon.

Prior to the revolution, Israel and Iran had diplomatic and economic ties, as well as cooperation in security and oil. This was also contributed to by both nations being partners of the United States.

However, the ideological shift after the revolution led to Iran supporting proxy groups, the first of which was Hezbollah. This also placed Iran on a path of confrontation with Israel due to its push for a nuclear program. This saw Israel and Iran become enemies, and this persists today.

Other key historical events in the 1990s, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent end of the Cold War, saw Syria and Iran remain close allies.

Photo by Mahmoud Sulaiman on Unsplash

In 1990, the Gulf War commenced, which was an armed conflict between Iraq and a coalition of 42 nations. This involved two phases: Operation Desert Shield (August 1990 - January 1991) and Operation Desert Storm (January 1991 - February 1991). Desert Shield involved a military buildup, with Desert Storm being the bombing campaign against Iraq, before the United States expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

It was the 2003 Iraq War and its aftermath that created some of the conditions for Iran to continue to gain influence.

The Rise of Iran’s Land Bridge

In March and April of 2003, we saw the United States invade Iraq. The aim of the coalition, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Poland, was to disarm Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Before the invasion, United Nations inspectors found no evidence of any of these weapons, despite Iraq using chemical weapons against Iran in the past. This coalition met little resistance on the ground, and they captured Baghdad 22 days after their initial invasion. Saddam Hussein and the central leadership went into hiding. Saddam was eventually captured in December 2003.

The removal of Saddam Hussein saw Iraqi Shia parties rise, largely due to their majority in Iraq’s population. This, in part, was caused by the United States dissolving the Iraqi army and also removing thousands of Ba’ath Party officials from the government. This led to mass unemployment, a weak Iraqi state, and a political vacuum.

The IRGC, especially the Quds Force under Qassem Soleimani, then supported the rise of military groups friendly to Iran, such as the Badr Organisation, Kata’ib Hezbollah, and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq.

This saw Iran gain influence in a nation that was once a geopolitical rival.

Photo by hosein charbaghi on Unsplash

The entire Middle East then experienced the Arab Spring in 2011.

This contributed to the Syrian Civil War, with citizens protesting over corruption, unemployment, political repression, and arrest and torture. The government responded violently, and this turned into a long, drawn-out conflict. Many groups took part in this conflict, including the Assad government, opposition groups, Islamist rebel groups, and the Kurds.

This involved Iran, because Syria, by this point, was an ally for decades, and the nation was vital in connecting Iran to Hezbollah and Lebanon in general. Hezbollah was Iran’s strongest proxy group. So, Iran offered advisors, military planners, and intelligence officers to support the Assad Regime, because they wanted to maintain their influence in Syria, and the bridge to Lebanon and Hezbollah.

ISIS also played a huge role in the Syrian Civil War. The United States departed Iraq in 2011. On paper, this would seem like Iran could then continue to expand its influence further in Iraq, but in the aftermath of the 2003 U.S. invasion, other military groups formed, including ISIS.

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi founded Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad in 2002, which later became Al-Qaeda in Iraq in 2004 after he pledged allegiance. The group continued to exist for the next few years, before then declaring itself as the “Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), or Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The decline and the power vacuum in Iraq after the United States’ invasion and departure were consequential in the rise of ISIS, and the geopolitical environment in the Middle East in the years to come.

ISIS was initially threatening Iran, especially Iraq’s Shi’a communities and the Syrian government forces that Iran supported. However, with ISIS’s threats, Iraq and Syria needed support. Iran benefited from this through continued military coordination and weapons trade.

Iraq also established the Popular Mobilisation Forces, which Iran trained and equipped.

It was in these supply routes that Iran’s land bridge was clear to see, with the map below from 2018.

https://geopoliticalfutures.com/iran-secured-supply-route-iraq/

This marked the period of Iran’s maximum extent and influence across the Middle East. They supported the Assad Regime during the Civil War, trained groups in Iraq, benefited from ISIS creating chaos, and retained access to Hezbollah in Lebanon.

But in what condition do we find this land bridge today?

The Status of The Bridge Today

At its peak, Iran influenced Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, as well as through Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Palestine, and the Houthis in Yemen.

Palestinian Islamic Jihad was an offshoot of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, which viewed its founders as too moderate. This has seen the group initiate more frequent attacks since its formation in 1984.

As for Hamas, they were formed in December 1987 after the First Intifada, which was a Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation. The group emerged from the Muslim Brotherhood’s Gaza group, which itself had been active since the 1950s.

Iranian support of Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas saw Iran hoping to support armed resistance against Israel and the support of the Palestinian cause. Since the Iranian Revolution, Israel and the United States have been ideologically opposed to Iran.

The Houthis, despite being founded in 1992, started their activity in 2004 after the death of their founder, Hussein al-Houthi, during clashes with the Yemeni government. This saw the Saada Wars commence between 2004 and 2010.

The group grew substantially in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. This culminated with the group taking the capital Sana’a in 2014, and this started the Yemeni Civil War, Saudi intervention, and the UAE’s involvement that we discussed a few weeks ago.

Iranian support of the Houthis was initially to counter the influence of the Saudis in their regional proxy war. With the China-brokered deal from 2023 between Saudi Arabia and Iran, tensions here have declined somewhat.

It’s through these groups, and those discussed earlier, that Iran sought leverage and influence across the Middle East. They could also do this with an amount of deniability, since it wasn’t their “direct” actions.

However, as of 2026, Iran’s land bridge is in its weakest condition in decades.

What was a coherent corridor is now a fragmented network of groups that are less connected.

During its peak between 2017 and 2022, Iran had a friendly government in Damascus, influence over Iraq’s security and militia groups, a powerful militia and political force in Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the route connecting Tehran, through all three of these nations, to the Mediterranean.

So, what were the key chapters of this decline, and where do these nations go from here? We’ll discuss this next time.

Concluding Remarks

Geopolitical influence is a peculiar force, largely because it is unpredictable and wide-ranging.

Today, a nation can seek to pressure another by restricting exports of a key foodstuff, for example. But the other nation could, in turn, respond by seeking out alternative suppliers, imposing restrictions, or improving domestic production.

What starts as a single move can trigger a chain reaction that reshapes the geopolitical environment.

With every single nation around the world making these moves against each other, we can never judge geopolitical moves in isolation.

The 2003 removal of Saddam Hussein was intended to reduce a threat in the Middle East, but it unintentionally spawned multiple other issues for the United States.

But geopolitical influence isn’t permanent, and the Game of Geopolitics never stops. The moves that create power can eventually weaken and collapse.

Next time, on Thursday, we’ll explore this idea and how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the economic collapse in Lebanon, and the Abraham Accords affected Iran’s declining land-bridge.

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Sources:

https://geopoliticalfutures.com/iran-secured-supply-route-iraq/
https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2019/06/18/burning-bridge/
https://www.britannica.com/event/Iranian-Revolution
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Hezbollah
https://www.britannica.com/topic/al-Qaeda-in-Iraq
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1982_Lebanon_War
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran%E2%80%93Iraq_War
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2003_invasion_of_Iraq
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_Spring
https://ecfr.eu/special/mapping_palestinian_politics/palestinian_islamic_jihad/
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Hamas
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Houthi-movement
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khmeimim_Air_Base
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tartus_naval_base

This Week In Geopolitics - 12th July 2026

Dylan Muggleton — Sun, 12 Jul 2026 14:34:42 GMT

Photo by Roman Kraft on Unsplash

Africa

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Asia

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Europe

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Middle East

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North America

Photo by Andy He on Unsplash

South America

Colombia Transition Suspended

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Other

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Israel's Role In The Future Direction of The Middle East

Dylan Muggleton — Thu, 09 Jul 2026 16:32:21 GMT

Contents

Introduction
Looking Forward In The Middle East
The Big Picture
Tensions In U.S.-Israel Relations
Concluding Remarks

Bitesize Edition

US–Iran Fragile Understanding - The US–Iran understanding remains structurally weak due to unresolved issues around uranium enrichment and the Strait of Hormuz. Iran is attempting to convert perceived gains into lasting strategic advantages, while the United States seeks de-escalation without having to concede leverage. The future remains uncertain due to conflicting interpretations, and this conflict having no clear winners as of today.
Israel as the Security Wildcard - Israel views a nuclear-capable Iran as an existential threat and is unlikely to accept any agreement that leaves Iran close to breakout capability. This creates a structural risk that Israel could independently escalate against Iran even after a US–Iran deal is concluded. Such a move would immediately test U.S. commitments and could force Washington into either restraint or renewed military involvement.
Domestic Political Constraints in Washington and Tel Aviv - U.S. policy is constrained by domestic political pressures, including Trump’s midterm risk and sensitivity to energy market disruptions such as a potential Strait of Hormuz closure. In Israel, Netanyahu faces coalition fragility and political pressure from the far right, alongside personal legal vulnerabilities linked to his corruption trial. These domestic political pressures increase the likelihood of risk-taking behaviour from both leaderships, but any move made by one could hurt the other.
Escalation Risks and US–Israeli Alignment - The convergence of tensions across Lebanon, Syria, Gaza, and Iran creates persistent escalation pressure even in periods of formal diplomacy, which, after the last few days of escalation, we do appear to have exited. Still, increasing rhetorical distance between Washington and Tel Aviv suggests growing misalignment over strategy and end goals. If Israel did act unilaterally against Iran during a period of relative calm, it could trigger a significant roadblock to navigate in US–Israeli trust.

Introduction

On Monday, we painted a picture of existing tensions in the Middle East. This includes Syria, Lebanon, Gaza, and the relations between Israel and Turkey, and Israel and Iran.

At the centre of these tensions is Israel. And so, today we’ll explore the Middle East, looking forward, and how Israel will determine whether the understanding turns into a final deal between the United States and Iran.

Note: I wrote this post on Monday. In the last few days, we’ve seen tensions escalate between the United States and Iran once again, without Israeli involvement as of today. As we’ve stated previously, there are currently no clear winners in this conflict, and so the most likely scenario is that this conflict will continue to exist in some form until this occurs. The likely forms are a stalemate until after the midterms, or a dramatic escalation to end it quickly. Despite this, Israel remains central to this current chapter in the Middle East, whether we’re in an escalatory chapter like the last few days or a period of relative calm, as the period prior was. Also, Israel has the power to restart this conflict itself at any time, even at a time when the United States could be attempting to negotiate. Throughout the post below, I have included sections of text such as this where I update my analysis based on the recent escalation over the last few days.

The Israeli Wildcard

Dylan Muggleton — Mon, 06 Jul 2026 14:26:40 GMT

Contents

Introduction
The Lack of Understanding
The Israeli Wildcard In The Middle East
Concluding Remarks

Bitesize Edition

Fragile Negotiations - The US–Iran understanding remains structurally weak even without additional actors. Key issues such as uranium enrichment levels and control over strategic maritime routes like the Strait of Hormuz remain unresolved. Iran is trying to turn its perceived gains into realised gains, while the United States is trying to contain escalation without giving up too much.
Escalation Pressure Points - Multiple regional flashpoints are feeding instability into the diplomatic process. Hezbollah activity in southern Lebanon and Israel’s operational objectives there are central to this dynamic. These overlapping conflicts increase the probability that the wider understanding fails to reach a final agreement, with an Iranian red line pushing for an end to the conflict in Lebanon.
Competing Regional Strategies - Israel’s military posture across Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza creates continuous friction with broader diplomatic objectives. Tensions involving Benjamin Netanyahu and Donald Trump add a political layer that complicates coordination with the United States. Meanwhile, regional rivals such as Turkey intensify strategic competition with Israel in Syria and the surrounding areas.
An Unstable Outlook - The convergence of proxy conflict, territorial disputes, and shifting alliances keeps the region highly volatile even if a final deal is achieved. Israel’s actions across multiple fronts make it a central variable in whether escalation or stabilisation occurs. The overall trajectory suggests that any breakdown in diplomacy could rapidly translate into a restart of the conflict, and that Israel would be heavily involved in this.

Introduction

Since the Memorandum of Understanding arose between the United States and Iran, the Israelis remain a key part of whether this understanding progresses to a full deal or if it collapses. This is because the Israelis have been heavily involved in this conflict from the start, and they remain so today.

Due to this Israeli involvement, today we’re going to analyse how Israel sees the current understanding, and whether they are incentivised to see this understanding turn into a final deal, or if they are actually likely to pursue its collapse.

There is the status of Iran’s nuclear enrichment, Israel’s own security, and an upcoming election, all connecting to the latest Israeli actions and their potential actions over the coming months across the Middle East. Let’s begin to explore this below.

The Lack of Understanding

Firstly, it’s worth noting that this Memorandum of Understanding could collapse with only the United States and Iran involved.

The enrichment question, where Iran’s 60% enriched uranium is, and the future status of the Strait of Hormuz, with Iran wanting to enact tolls, seem to be the biggest points of contention that could see a deal collapse with only the United States and Iran’s involvement.

But when we introduce the Israelis into this, it does seem like the understanding is even more likely to collapse rather than reach a final deal.

The Israeli Wildcard In The Middle East

The Israelis remain involved in many of the narratives still unfolding in the Middle East.

A deal between the United States and Iran is seemingly conditional on peace in Lebanon, according to the Iranians. In fact, Iran announced the Strait of Hormuz was shut once again after Israel attacked Lebanon on Saturday, June 20th.

In response, Israel set three key conditions for withdrawing from Southern Lebanon: the withdrawal of Hezbollah north of the Litani River, the dismantling of Hezbollah infrastructure south of the Litani, and full Israeli freedom of action to remove any threats it determines in Lebanon. Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich stated that the military could stay “for years” in Lebanon, and that they aren’t moving “a millimetre” until Hezbollah disarms. The Israelis are also having success against Hezbollah in Lebanon, capturing a drone factory and launch site a few weeks ago. This is likely to clash with Iran's desire for an end to the conflict in Lebanon, with Hezbollah still Iran’s strongest proxy group, despite a decline in its strength over the last few years. This declining strength is a trend the Israelis will want to continue, putting Israel and Iran on opposite sides of the situation in Lebanon.

Photo by Kassem Mahfouz on Unsplash

Netanyahu has also stated he will maintain Israel’s buffer zone in Lebanon, while also stating the war against Iran isn’t over until regime change and the retrieval of Iran’s enriched uranium have occurred.

This has seen tensions mount between Trump and Netanyahu. Trump criticised Netanyahu for his recent aggressive rhetoric while he and his administration are in pursuit of a peace that they greatly need. In response, Netanyahu has stated he wants Israel to reduce aid received from the United States to zero.

Just a few months ago, Trump joined the war with Israel. Now, he seemingly wants to distance from Netanyahu.

Introducing Israel adds to the difficulty in the pursuit of this understanding. The biggest question I have is whether Israel’s presence in Southern Lebanon upends the understanding between the United States and Iran, and then how this could contribute to shifts in U.S-Israeli relations.

For now, the changes in relations between the United States and Israel are largely rhetorical. Trump stated he would ask Syria to help against Hezbollah because they would do a “better job in Lebanon than Israel”. Al Sharaa and the Syrians rejected this U.S. pressure. Israel remains relevant in Syria also because they still hold the Golan Heights and territory in Southern Syria heading towards Damascus. Israel continues to affect the Middle East outside of Lebanon and Gaza, and the potential for a renewed conflict with Iran.

We also have rising tensions between the Israelis and the Turks, both of whom have hopes of becoming a regional power in the Middle East. Turkey has accused Israel of being the primary source of regional instability, in large part through its territorial expansion into Gaza, Syria, and Lebanon.

Any instability in Syria directly affects Turkey due to their shared border. The Turks hold a de facto security belt on the Syrian border, which is also used to counter the Kurds.

For Israel, they worry that Turkey could establish a large military footprint in Syria. Israel worries about how this would affect its own security, as it also shares a border with Syria.

With both nations being active militarily in Syria, this is a potential area of direct interaction between the two.

Photo by Mahmoud Sulaiman on Unsplash

This interaction would naturally pit Turkey and Israel on opposite sides, with both seeking increased influence in Syria and the region generally. In the last week, Israel has moved to formally recognise the mass death of Armenians during World War I as genocide, heavily angering the Turks. This battle between Israel and Turkey seems set to remain.

And, we still have elevated tensions in Gaza, which remains in an environment of immense suffering. Also, in the West Bank, Israel continues to expand settlements unopposed.

As the domains of modern-day conflict continue to expand, the Israelis and Iran also remain in conflict in some areas, such as espionage. Last week, a 20-year-old U.S. citizen was arrested in Jerusalem, charged with spying for Iran.

So, many areas of tension remain across the Middle East involving the Israelis. The question is, how does the Middle East move forward from this current environment? Do tensions fall, or will we see them spike once again? The answer to this question, and the reasons behind its answer, have Israel at its centre, as we’ll discuss on Thursday.

Concluding Remarks

There are many points in this understanding that could lead to a collapse and no final deal. However, introducing the Israelis shows that they could return to war with Iran at any time, collapsing the deal that Donald Trump badly needs.

And so, on Thursday, we’ll explore the potential futures in the Middle East, largely revolving around Israel, before then analysing how such futures could negatively impact relations between the United States and Israel.

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